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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DESERET LIVESTOCK COMPANY, 
a corporation, and 
ANSCHUTZ LAND & LIVESTOCK 
COMPANY, INC., a corpora-
tion, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 14008 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action against an electric utility 
brought by two of its customers claiming damages to irrigation 
pumps and loss of crops and forage allegedly resulting from 
negligence of the utility and for breach of contract to 
supply electric power and for breach of implied warranty of 
fitness of electrical power supplied to said customers. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT 
':'*•* The case was tried in the District Court of Salt 
Lake County, Utah, before Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, 
sitting without a jury. At the close of plaintiff's case 
defendant moved for dismissal. The Court reserved a ruling 
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on the motion and defendant proceeded with its case. Upon 
conclusion of the trial, the Court granted defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL ^ 
Plaintiffs-Appellants seek to have the judgment of 
the trial court reversed and remanded for trial or, alterna-
tively, for judgment for plaintiffs and remand for determina-
tion of damages. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
Defendant does not agree with the statement of 
facts as set forth in plaintiffs1 brief in that such statement 
omits certain material facts relative to damages, to the 
time of occurrence of the incident giving rise to this 
action, to the number of customers supplied on the same 
electric distribution line which supplied service to plaintiffs, 
to the physical electric distribution system on plaintiffs1 
properties and in other respects. Defendant therefore 
submits its own Statement of Material Facts. 
For purposes of brevity, plaintiffs Deseret Live-
stock Company and Anschutz Land and Livestock Company, Inc., 
will be referred to as Deseret and Anschutz; defendant Utah 
Power & Light Company will be referred to as Utah Power. 
Deseret and Anschutz are both corporations and both 
owned certain ranching and livestock property in Skull Valley, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Tooele County, Utah. Subsequent to the commencement of the 
action, Deseret sold all of its properties to Skull Valley 
Company, a Utah limited partnership (R. 2). Deseret and 
Anschutz are both customers of Utah Power and receive electric 
power for various purposes, including the operation of 
electric motors and pumps used for irrigation pumping. 
Plaintiffs are both served from what is known as the Skull 
Valley No. 1 Circuit (Ex. 6-P, R. 49-50). Approximately 
sixty-five customers, including seventeen irrigation pumping 
customers, are supplied with service from this same line (R. 
50) . 
Electric power is delivered to both plaintiffs at a 
specified point of delivery, beyond which point they each use 
such power for their respective electric requirements. 
Deseret owns, operates and maintains its own electric dis-
tibution lines with associated transformers, fuses and other 
devices, which lines run from the point of delivery to 
various points of use on Deseretfs property. 
Mr. Beck, Manager of the Deseret ranch, testified 
that the various distribution lines owned by Deseret are (1) 
one-half mile long, (2) one hundred yards long, (3) one 
hundred yards long, and (4) one-quarter mile long (R. 14). 
Deseret and Utah Power entered into an electric 
service agreement (Ex. 2-P). Said agreement refers to and 
incorporates Utah Powerfs Electric Service Regulations as 
filed with the Public Service Commission of Utah. Mr. A. R. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Dunn, Manager of Rates for Utah Power, testified (R. 70) that 
such regulations set forth the conditions, definitions and 
characteristics under which electric service is supplied to 
a customer. Said regulations provide in part that Utah Power 
does not guarantee its service against irregularities and 
interruptions and further that the customer assumes all 
responsibility on its side from the point of delivery for the 
service supplied and the electrical installation used there-
with (R. 72). 
Mr. Beck, Manager of Deseret, testified (R. 13) 
that around the 18th or 20th of June of 1970, in the morning, 
he discovered that the irrigation pumps were not operating. 
He immediately called Mr. Al Nytch of Utah Electric Motor to 
repair same (R. 8). He called Mr. Nytch in the morning and 
he came out the same day (R. 13). Mr. Nytch, in his deposition, 
received in evidence, stated that he was informed the pumps 
went out the prior evening and he was called but not reached 
at that time. Mr. Beck did not notify Utah Power relative to 
any problem with the irrigation pumps (R. 18). Three pumps 
were operating on the Deseret ranch at the time (R. 17) and 
one pump was damaged (Dep. 8). The damaged pump was out of 
service for sixty to seventy days (R. 9). It was used for 
pumping water for irrigating five hundred acres used for 
growing hay and forage (R. 9). Mr. Beck testified that 
because of the unavailability of water on this tract, one 
thousand tons of hay were not produced and two or three 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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months of forage for one thousand cattle was lost (R. 10). 
Mr. Daniel Freed, Vice President of Deseret, testified (R. 
20) that the hay was worth $30 to $35 per ton and would have 
cost $7 to $8 per ton to harvest. He further testified (R. 
21) that the forage was valued at $.15 per day per head of 
cattle. He stated that it was not necessary for Deseret to 
purchase any feed to replace that which was claimed lost 
because of the lack of water (R. 23). 
Mr. Nytch stated that the damage to the pump was 
caused by a sustained outage followed by a phase reversal 
which occurs when one electric line is switched with another 
(Dep. 11) and that such occurrence must be man made and can 
only be man corrected (Dep. 25-26). The cost of repairs to 
the Deseret pumps attributable to the phase reversal was 
$7,837.11 (Ex. 3-P, 4-P and R. 22). 
Mr. Max Arneson, Manager of Anschutz's ranch, 
testified that he was in Wasatch County when he received a 
call from Mr. George Slaugh, foreman of the Anschutz Skull 
Valley ranch, informing him that one of the irrigation pumps 
was not working (R. 30). Mr. Arneson was unable to recall 
the date of the call other than that it was sometime in 
June, 1970 (R. 31). He testified the pump was out for sixty 
to seventy days but that repairs were all complete by August 
4, 1970 (R. 32). He stated the repair invoice was paid in 
September, was dated August 4, 1970, and that repairs were 
completed by that date (R. 32). There were two pumps on the 
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Anschutz ranch but only one was damaged (R. 27, 38). Anschutz 
did not purchase any feed to replace that not produced 
because of the lack of water (R. 32). Mr. Arneson stated 
that there are one or two ranches having wells and pumps 
located between the Deseret and Anschutz ranches (R. 33). 
He testified the value of the lost forage at $4.50 per head 
of cattle per month, that the irrigated property served by 
the damaged pump would serve three hundred head of cattle, 
that the forage was lost for a three-month period (R. 29-30) 
and that: the repair bill for pump repairs was $1,679.84 
(R. 29-30). Mr. George Slaugh, Anschutz!s foreman, testified 
that when he discovered the pump was not working, he called 
Mr. Arneson who instructed him to call Mr. Nytch to make the 
repairs (R. 37). He stated the problem occurred around the 
18th or 20th of June (R. 38). Mr. Nytch stated that Mr. 
Slaugh called him approximately five days or so after the 
incident: occurred (Dep. 4). 
Mr. Nytch stated (Dep. 19) that the damage to the 
Anschutz pump was caused by phase reversal and that the 
Deseret and Anschutz pumps now have devices to protect 
against such phase reversal but neither had such devices at 
the time of the pump failure (Dep. 9). 
Arthur J. Nielson, Jr., witness for plaintiffs, and 
Dale Brown, witness for defendant, both testified (R. 100 
and R. 61) that a phase reversal occurs from a switching or 
reversing of conductors from their proper order on a three 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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phase circuit. Mr. Brown testified that a phase reversal 
would effect all users on the same circuit (R. 69), that it 
.^ . could not be accomplished without an outage, that it could 
not be done with hot live lines (R. 91) and that it would 
take ten to fifteen minutes to physically accomplish the 
reversal (R. 92). : 
Plaintiffs1 witness Nielson testified (R. 105-
106) that a phase reversal need not occur on a pole-mounted 
j electric line but can occur on the ground at the terminal 
box of the motor or could occur at the substation or generating 
plant or at any place in between (R. 107). He also stated 
: (R. 107) that a phase reversal to cause damage to both the 
Deseret and Anschutz properties would have to result from 
action taking place above the Anschutz ranch and toward the 
substation or generating plant. 
Mr. David Robinson, attorney for plaintiffs and 
Vice President, Secretary and Treasurer of Deseret, stated 
(R. 45) that a demand letter written by him on February 11, 
1971, was, to his knowledge, the first notification given 
to Utah Power relative to the subject occurrence. 
Mr. Gail A. Parker, District Representative of 
Utah Power's Tooele office stated (ft. 50) that approximately 
sixty-five customers are served from the same line that 
supplies service to plaintiffs. He also testified that no 
trouble calls or outage reports were received from either 
Deseret or Anschutz or any other customer served from the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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subject electrical line during the period around June 18, 
1970, or for several days prior to and after that date and 
that no work was being done during this period at the Skull 
Valley Substation (R. 51-52, 54). ft -
At the conclusion of plaintiffs1 case, defendant 
made a Motion to Dismiss (R. 43) for lack of proof in 
establishing any negligence or liability on the part of 
defendant. The motion was taken under advisement (R. 44) 
and defendant, without waiving same, proceeded to put on its 
case. Upon the close of all evidence, the matter was argued 
and taken under advisement. The Court subsequently issued a 
memorandum decision granting defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
Thereafter, an Order of Dismissal was entered and an objec-
tion to same was filed because said Order did not contain 
Findings and Conclusions. Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, together with an Order or Dismissal were then made 
and entered and plaintiffs filed their objections thereto. 
After a denial of such objections, this appeal was taken. 
ARGUMENT 
- ••• - • . . POINT I •" • •'• t 
THE JUDGMENT AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL COURT ARE 
PRESUMED TO BE CORRECT AND THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT 
SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN SUCH A MANNER AS WILL SUPPORT 
THE JUDGMENT. 
.-''.• . There are numerous cases supporting the general 
proposition of law that the judgment and proceedings in the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
- 9 -
trial court are presumed to be correct and the trial court's 
findings should be reviewed in such a manner as will support 
the judgment. Leithead v. Adair, 10 Utah 2d 282, 351 P.2d 
956. It is well established that the duty of the appella-fe 
court is to review the evidence in a light most favorable to 
the findings. Parrish v. Tahtaras, 7 Utah 2d 87, 318 P.2d 
642; Petrie v. General Contracting Company, 17 Utah 2d 408, 
413 P.2d 600. This Court succinctly stated the rule in 
Lawrence v. Bamberger Railroad Company, 3 Utah 2d 247, 282 
P.2d 335, and it was there stated as follows: 
When the Court has made findings and 
entered judgment thereon as was done here, 
it is then our duty to review the 
evidence in the light most favorable 
,. to the findings, and they must be 
allowed to stand if reasonable 
minds could agree with them. Likewise 
every reasonable intendment ought 
to be indulged in favor of the 
validity and correctness of the 
judgment under review, and it will 
not be disturbed unless the appellant 
meets his burden of affirmatively 
showing error. 
T POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED ALL OF THE EVIDENCE 
PRESENTED BY BOTH PARTIES IN MAKING ITS FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND SAME ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE 
: v s _ EVIDENCE PRESENTED 
At the conclusion of plaintiff's case, defendant 
moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of proof of any 
negligence or liability on the part of defendant (R. 43). 
The motion was taken under advisement and defendant proceeded 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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to put on evidence without waiving the motion. The motion 
was, therefore, continuing and was recognized by the Court 
and by all parties as being a continuing motion. 
Rule 41(b) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
specifically provides that if a motion to dismiss is made at 
the conclusion of plaintiffs1 case, the Court, as trier of 
the facts, may then determine them or may decline to render 
any judgment until the close of all the evidence. The trial 
court took the matter under advisement and at the close of 
all evidence then granted the continuing motion to dismiss. 
The trial court's reservation of a ruling on the 
motion at the time it was made was nothing more than a 
determination that judgment should not be entered at that 
time but should be reserved until the close of all the 
evidence in accordance with the provisions of Rule 41(b). 
Although the Court's ruling was here made at the conclusion 
of the case and pursuant to a continuing motion to dismiss, 
the situation is analogous to that where such a motion is 
denied at the conclusion of plaintiffs1 case and then 
granted after all the evidence is presented. In such 
situation the apparent reversal by the court of its own 
previous ruling is a circumstance fully contemplated by the 
language of Rule 41(b) which specifically permits the court 
to render judgment at the close of plaintiffs' case or 
" . . . he may decline to render any judgment until the close 
of all the evidence." In that regard, 5 Moore's Federal 
Practice, at page 1159, states: Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
- 11 -
As previously noted, he may conclude 
that it is inadvisable to sustain 
:,•-•. defendant's motion midway in the trial 
and that the trial should be completed, 
•:•-• even though technically he may sustain 
defendant's motion. The denial amounts 
to nothing more than a refusal to enter 
judgment at that time; constitutes only 
a tentative ruling; and does not preclude 
the trial judge from making at the close 
-• of the case findings and determinations 
at variance with his prior tentative 
ruling. 
In the instant case, where the court determined to 
hear all of the evidence before rendering its decision on 
defendant's Motion to Dismiss, it would be clearly unreason-
able and improper for the court to base such decision on 
only a part of the evidence. 
The trial court made fourteen Findings of Fact, 
all of which were fully supported by the evidence and which are 
substantially included, in narrative form, in the Statement 
of Material Facts herein, with references to record pages. 
Plaintiffs principally take issue with Findings of 
Fact No. 4 and Conclusion of Law No. 1. Such Finding, 
in substance, is that Utah Power at or near the time plaintiffs 
claim the irrigation pumps were damaged did not (1) experience 
any electrical outage or disturbance on its Skull Valley 
line, (2) did not receive any complaint or trouble call from 
any of the sixty-five customers served by said line, and 
(3) did not perform any maintenance or repair work on said 
l i n e . •.>'••? / : . • > • • • • '.:-.•' ;. •••• r \ -•• 
I(L . Evidence to support such finding clearly appears 
from the testimony offered by Mr. Parker, the employee in Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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charge of Utah Power's Tooele office (R. 51-52, 54). 
Plaintiffs offered no evidence to the contrary. Exhibit 6-P 
illustrates the total Skull Valley circuit showing all the 
customers served from this line. Defendant's witness Brown 
testified (R. 91-92) that a phase reversal could not be 
accomplished without an outage and that it would take a 
minimum of ten to fifteen minutes to physically reverse the 
conductors and create a phase reversal. Plaintiffs' witness 
Nytch agreed that an outage was necessary to cause a phase 
reversal and testified that the outage would ". . . have to 
have been sustained for a while.ff (Dep. 11). ~ ^ 
The lack of any communication to Utah Power at the 
time in question from any of the sixty-five customers 
supplied with service by the same line as that serving i^  
plaintiffs, who would have experienced an electrical outage 
for ten to fifteen minutes, combined with the fact that no 
repairs were being performed or were required on such line at 
the time in question, leads to the inescapable conclusion 
that the damage sustained by plaintiffs were isolated 
instances occurring only on their properties and affecting 
only their facilities. , .*..•-• . :••• 
In view of the evidence presented on this issue by 
defendant and the lack of any contrary evidence presented by 
plaintiffs, the trial court's Finding of Fact No. 14 was 
fully supported by the evidence and based, in part, on such 
findings, the Court properly concluded that defendant was 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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not negligent in the operation or maintenance of its electrical 
lines in supplying service to its customers. 
POINT III 
RES IPSA LOQUITUR IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE 
FACTS OF THIS CASE 
Applicant alleges that the instant case presents a 
proper factual situation for application of the doctrine of 
res ipsa loquitur. This court in numerous cases has considered 
the doctrine and the factual elements required for its 
application are well establishedin this jurisdiction. Signi-
ficantly, the court has on several occasions dealt with the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as specifically applied to 
public utility service. 
In Loos v. Mountain Fuel Supply Company, 108 P.2d 
254 (1940), an action was brought for injuries and damages 
sustained as a result of a natural gas explosion occurring 
in a pipe beneath a rental unit of Utah Motor Park. The gas 
company supplied gas to the motor park at two meters. The 
motor park then piped the gas to the furnaces and ranges in 
individual cabins within the park. The gas company had no 
control over the gas pipes and appliances within the motor 
park and beyond the gas meters. There is no evidence of 
specific negligence on the part of the gas company, and 
plaintiff sought to have such negligence established by 
application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The court 
there held that the doctrine could not be invoked against 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the gas company because it did not have any control over 
the gas facilities where the explosion occurred. l< 
A more thorough treatment of the subject is found 
in the frequently cited case of Wightman v. Mountain 
Fuel Supply Co., 5 Utah 2d 373, 302 P.2d 471 (1956). This was 
an action seeking damages resulting from a natural gas 
explosion in a private residence. The gas company installed 
all the piping to the meter. All piping beyond the meter 
and to the individual gas appliances had been done by a 
local plumber. This court, in holding that the evidence was 
insufficient to justify submission of the case to a jury 
under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, stated as follows: 
In order to invoke this doctrine it is 
generally recognized that the following 
* ; elements must be present: (1) That the 
accident was of a kind which, in the 
ordinary course of events, would not 
have happened had due care been observed; 
(2) That it happened irrespective of any 
participation by the plaintiff; and (3) *""' 
That the cause thereof was something 
under the management or control of the 
defendant, or for which it is responsible. 
It is to be conceded that elements (1) 
and (2) above are satisfied by the facts 
in the instant case. It is element No. 
(3) that here gives us concern. This ^ * 
requisite is generally phrased in terms 
of "exclusive control11 over the instrument-
ality which caused the injury. However, 
as pointed out by Dean Prosser, the use 
.of such terminology is often not realistically 
applicable to the situation. He makes 
reference to examples of malfunctioning
 r 
machinery, defective appliances and 
other situations where the instrumentality 
has passed beyond the control of the 
person responsible for its condition and , 
is being used by and under the complete 
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control of the plaintiff. As suggested 
by that eminent authority, it would seem 
more accurate to appraise the situation 
in terms of the defendant's responsibility 
for the instrumentality, its condition 
or function, rather than merely its 
control. Whether it is in the defendant's 
exclusive control or not, if the evidence 
reasonably eliminates other explanations 
than the defendant's negligence, that 
provides the basis upon which the jury 
may be permitted to infer that it was 
defendant's negligence which resulted in 
the injury. We are therefore not here 
r T concerned with what degree of control 
the gas company had over the pipes 
_ , leading into the meter and the meter 
itself which it had installed. We 
proceed upon the assumption that the gas 
company was responsible for that part of 
the system, leaving the responsibility 
upon the Wightmans for their house 
piping, furnace and gas water heater. 
This brings us to the issue, crucial to 
the plaintiff's case, whether her 
evidence was sufficient upon which to 
base a finding that the source of the 
explosion was in the area for which the 
gas company was responsible. Such proof 
cannot rest upon speculation or conjecture, 
nor upon a mere choice of probabilities. 
To give rise to a jury question there 
must be something in the evidence from 
which the jury could reasonably believe 
that there is a greater probability that 
the explosion occurred in that part of 
the installation than in the pipes or 
appliances installed by and under the 
care of the Wightmans. Only if there is 
some such basis in the evidence would 
there be any foundation to permit the 
jury, under res ipsa loquitur, to infer 
that some defect or lack of due care in 
the gas company's part of the installation 
caused the leak and the resulting 
v explosion. 
The standards set forth in the Wightman case 
were later affirmed in Talbot v. L.D.S. Hospital, 21 Utah 2d 
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73, 440 P.2d 872 (1968), and in Lund v. Mountain Fuel Supply 
Company, 15 Utah 2d 10, 386 P.2d 408 (1963). ; 
A recent decision by the Supreme Court of Montana, 
Hash v. Montana Power Company, 524 P.2d 1092 (1974), is one 
of many from other jurisdictions which reaches the same 
conclusion as that of the Wightman case with respect to the 
application of res ipsa loquitur. In that case, which 
concerned a fire originating in a meter box affixed to 
plaintiff's building, the court in holding that res ipsa 
loquitur was not applicable stated as follows: 
To hold that defendant must supply an 
explanation for every fire that occurs 
on private property to which it supplies 
electricity, when it can be shown that 
the fire developed through arcing in the 
meter box would have virtually the force 
and effect of making defendant strictly 
liable for injuries which occur without 
proof of negligence on its part. 
1
 Even if it might be determined that a 
power company is in the same relative 
position to the general public as that 
of a common carrier and, therefore, as a 
matter of public policy, it should be 
required to explain accidents which 
occur through its equipment, this case 
does not fall within that principle. The 
fire occurred on plaintiff's property 
within equipment owned by it. There is 
no reason to believe that defendant is 
in a better position to explain how the 
accident happened than is plaintiff. 
u
 In the foregoing Montana case, the theory was 
advanced by plaintiff's expert witness, in the absence of 
any specific showing of defendant's negligence, that the 
fire was caused by a power surge through the electric lines 
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serving plaintiff's property. That theory was apparently 
rejected by the jury in view of the power company's evidence, 
similar to evidence presented in the instant case, that no 
irregularities in electric service were brought to the power 
company's attention by its other customers and that no 
defects were found in the service lines. 
The facts of the instant case, particularly with 
regard to the necessary element of control by the defendant, 
clearly do not fall within that type of case to which the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can be applied. The physical 
manner in which electric service is supplied to plaintiffs is 
far different from that where a short drop line conveys 
power from a distribution line at the rear of a residence or 
building lot to a meter affixed to a house or building. 
Electric power is delivered to plaintiffs at certain metering 
points from which it is then conveyed through plaintiffs' own 
lines and associated facilities to various points of use on 
their respective ranches. Plaintiffs' witness Beck, in his 
testimony (R. 14), described four customer-owned lines on the 
Deseret ranch that are respectively one-half mile long, one 
hundred yards long, one hundred yards long, and one-quarter 
mile long. These lines, together with transformers, fuses 
and other devices are owned, operated and maintained by 
Deseret. Utah Power has no control whatever over these 
lines or their operation or maintenance. Accordingly, while 
the damaged pumps were both owned, operated and maintained 
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by plaintiffs on their own respective properties, the addi-
tional element is present here, particularly in the case of 
Deseret, that the power to serve such pumps is conveyed on 
their own electric facilities at various, but substantial, 
distances from the metering point to the actual point of 
use. The requisite element of defendant's control is completely 
lacking. 
Plaintiffs rely on the contention that the court 
should disregard all of the traditional control factors and 
find that res ipsa loquitur applies because the electric 
power was "faulty.11 Under such theory plaintiffs allege 
that consideration need not be given to such independent 
factors as referred to above, i.e., the damage occurring 
solely on plaintiffs1 properties, occurring to their electrical 
equipment, the operation and maintenance of which are under 
their exclusive control, and the occurrence of damage at a 
considerable distance from the point where electric power 
is delivered to the interconnected electrical facilities 
owned by plaintiffs. This contention, relative to control by 
the defendant, was fully considered and disposed of by this 
court in the Wightman case. On that issue the court stated: 
Finally, plaintiff makes the contention 
that it was not the pipes, appliances or 
meter which caused the explosion, but 
the gas itself, which is under the 
exclusive management and control of 
defendant, so the rule of res ipsa 
loquitur would apply. The position 
cannot be sustained. If such were the 
case, the rule could be invoked against 
the supplier of gas in any case of 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
- 19 -
injury resulting therefrom, regardless 
of whether the facilities were installed 
by the gas company and regardless of the , ,. 
amount of control or the kind of care 
exercised over them by others. This 
would be an impractical and insuperable 
burden which is not imposed by the law -*,.. 
in Utah nor of other jurisdictions. 
One additional factor that must be considered in 
determining whether or not negligence should be predicated on 
the theory of res ipsa loquitur relates to the evidence 
regarding the time when each plaintiff sustained damage to 
its respective pump. There is a complete absence of competent 
evidence that the damage to the respective pumps resulted from 
a simultaneous occurrence. No showing was made that the 
incidents were simultaneous and, to the contrary, the evidence is 
completely conflicting in this regard. Mr. Beck (Deseret) 
stated the damage occurred around the 18th or 20th of June and 
he immediately called Mr. Nytch (R. 13). Mr. Nytch stated 
he was called on June 21 (Dep. 17). Mr. Arneson (Anschutz) 
placed the time of the pump damage as sometime in June (R. 31). 
Mr. Slaugh (Anschutz) testified the incident occurred f!. . . 
somewhere around the 18th or 20th of June, somewhere there 
. . . ," (R. 38) and he immediately called Mr. Arneson and Mr. 
Nytch (R. 37). Mr. Nytch stated Mr. Slaugh called him five 
days or so after the incident occurred (Dep. 4). It is 
apparent that this evidence not only fails to establish that 
the pump damage occurred simultaneously on both properties, but 
there is no clear showing as to the specific time the damage 
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occurred on either property. Further, and indicative of 
the lack of unanimity in establishing a believable time of 
occurrence, Mr. Arneson stated the Anschutz pump was out 
of service for sixty to seventy days (R. 29) but that repairs 
were completed by August 4 (R. 32). The obvious conclusion 
drawn from that testimony of the manager of the Anschutz 
Ranch is that the damage to its pump occurred between May 24 
and June 4. 
POINT IV 
1
 THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT DEFENDANT 
DID NOT BREACH THE WRITTEN AGREEMENT TO SUPPLY ELECTRIC 
SERVICE TO PLAINTIFF DESERET OR THE IMPLIED AGREEMENT 
TO SUPPLY PLAINTIFF ANSCHUTZ 
An electric service agreement between Utah Power 
and Deseret was introduced and received in evidence as 
Exhibit 2-P. No similar agreement between Utah Power and 
Anschutz is in evidence but plaintiffs in Point V of their 
brief nevertheless refer to agreements with both parties and, in 
fact, refer therein to specific terms of an agreement with Hatch 
(Anschutz) regarding amounts of kilowatts, cycles and volts of 
power to be supplied under such non-offered agreement. 
With respect to the one electric service agreement 
that is in evidence (Ex. 2-P), the agreement specifically 
provides that it is subject to the Company's Electric Service 
Regulations, designated as Original Regulations, P.S.C.U. 
No. 8, which were attached thereto and made a part thereof 
(R. 71). These regulations were described by Mr. A. R. 
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Dunn, Utah Power's Manager of Rates, as being a set of rules 
setting forth the conditions, definitions and characteristics 
under which the Company agrees to supply electric service to 
a customer and under which the customer agrees to accept 
service from the company (R. 70). 
Regulations No. 18 and 24 are particularly pertinent 
to the instant case. Said regulations read as follows: 
THE SUPPLYING AND TAKING OF SERVICE 
18. Continuity of Service. The Company 
shall use reasonable diligence to pro-
vice steady and continuous service, but 
does not guarantee its service against 
irregularities and interruptions. The 
Company having used reasonable diligence 
shall not be liable to Customers for any 
damages occasioned by irregularities or 
interruptions. 
22. Customer's Responsibility. The 
Customer assumes all responsbility on 
Customer's side of the Point of Delivery 
for service supplied or taken, as well 
as for the electrical installation and 
appliances used in connection therewith, 
and will indemnify, save harmless and 
defend the Company against all claims, 
demands, costs or expense, for loss, 
damage or injury to persons or property, 
in any manner directly or indirectly 
connected with, or growing out of, the 
transmission or use of electric service 
by the Customer, at or on the Customer's 
side of the Point of Delivery. 
" Plaintiff Anschutz's knowledge and acceptance of its 
responsibility for all repairs on the Customer's side of the 
point of delivery is clearly evidenced by the testimony of 
its manager, Mr. Arneson. He was specifically asked if Hatch 
(Anschutz) Ranch accepted responsibility for repairs on the 
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users side of the meter and he answered affirmatively 
(R. 27). I 
Defendant has been unable to find any case where 
this court has considered a situation involving a claimed 
breach of a public utility agreement. Plaintiffs cite cases 
from other jurisdictions and defendant could likewise supply 
similar cases in support of its position. Such cases, 
however, from other jurisdictions, are of little value here 
because they do not involve the specific qualifying condi-
tions contained in the Electric Service Regulations, as 
quoted above, relative to the supplying and taking of 
service applicable to the Deseret agreement and to the 
service agreements with all other customers of Utah Power. 
With respect to the implied agreement to supply 
service to Anschutz, the result is the same. All electric 
service supplied by Utah Power was and is subject to the 
Electric Service Regulations filed as a part of the tariffs 
for such service. To hold that the service provided by the 
Company to a particular customer was not subject to same 
would not only be discriminatory as to other customers but 
would directly circumvent the jurisdiction and authority of 
the Public Service Commission. The Commission's jurisdic-
tion in this area is clear. Section 54-4-1, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended, vests the Commission with 
jurisdiction ". . .to supervise and regulate every public 
utility in this state and to supervise all of the business 
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of each such public utility in this state . . . ." The 
Commission's responsibility with regard to rules and regula-
tions applicable to the furnishing of utility service is set 
forth in §54-4-18, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 
wherein it is provided in part that: 
. . . the Commission shall have power 
after a hearing to ascertain and fix 
just and reasonable standards, classifi-
cations, regulations, practices, measure-
ments of the service to be furnished, 
imposed, observed and followed by all 
electrical, gas and water corporations; 
. . . . (Emphasis added) 
The service agreement and regulations are specifically 
clear in stating that Utah Power does not guarantee its 
service against irregularities and further that the customer 
assumes all responsibility on its side of the point of 
delivery for service supplied. With such language applicable 
to the agreements in question, the trial court could not 
conclude otherwise than that there was no breach of contract 
by defendant. 
; .., POINT V . ; 
THE TRIAL COURT COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT THERE 
WAS NO IMPLIED WARRANTY OF FITNESS APPLICABLE TO 
THE ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLIED BY DEFENDANT TO PLAINTIFFS 
The trial court, in addition to its conclusion 
that there was no breach of the agreement to supply plaintiffs 
with electric power further concluded that defendant made no 
specific or implied warranties as to the supply of such 
power. 
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At the outset reference is again made to the 
e
 Electric Service Regulations set forth in Point IV above 
relative to the supply and taking of electric service. The 
specific disclaimer of a guarantee in Regulation No. 18, 
and the specific assumption by the customer, in Regulation 
No. 22, of all responsibility on its side of the point of 
delivery for service taken, fully negates the imposition of 
any implied warranties applicable to the relationship between 
the parties. Such conclusion applies not only to Deseret 
with whom a specific written service agreement is in evidence 
but applies equally to Anschutz inasmuch as the aforesaid 
regulations are a part of Utah Power's tariffs, designated 
as P.S.C.U. No. 8, filed with and approved by the Public 
Service Commission of Utah and are applicable to all electric 
service supplied to all customers within the state of Utah. 
The principal that the provisions of a utility's 
filed service regulations cover the business relationship 
between such utility and its customers, and are binding on 
both, is firmly established and this is true irrespective of 
the existence of a formal written agreement to supply service. 
While no Utah cases on the subject were found, many decisions 
are available from other jurisdictions. In Cullinane 
v. Potomac Electric Power, 147 A.2d 768 (D. C. 1959), 
the court held that an electric companyfs rules and regula-
tions, filed with and approved by the regulatory agency, 
entered into contracts made with the utility and are binding 
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on both the customer and the utility in the absence of any 
unfair practice on the part of the utility; actual knowledge 
thereof or assent is legally immaterial. In Carroway v. 
Carolina Power and Light Company, 84 S.E.2d 728 (So. Car. 
1954), the court said the utility company's service regulations, 
on file with and approved by the Public Service Commission, 
have the force and effect of law and are binding on the 
plaintiff regardless of whether or not he agreed to them. 
Further, in Illinois Bell Telephone Company v. Miner, 136 
N.E.2d 1 (111. 1956), it was held that a telephone company's 
tariffs on file with the Commission is a necessary component 
and integral part of its contract and relationships with 
subscribers and the subscribers are bound thereby and cannot 
deviate therefrom. To the same effect is a Federal Court of 
Appeals ruling in Slenderella Systems v. Pacific Telephone 
and Telegraph, 286 F.2d 488 (1966). Similarly, it was held 
in Wilkinson v. New England Telephone Company, 97 N.E.2d 413 
(Mass. 1951) that the obligation of the telephone company to 
render service to a subscriber is limited by its regulations 
which, on filing, become an integral part of the relationship 
with the subscriber. 
Clearly there were no written or express warranties 
made by Utah Power to Deseret or Anschutz. To the contrary, 
the intention not to so warrant is evident from Electric 
Service Regulations Nos. 18 and 22 and the conditions stated 
therein applicable to the supplying and taking of electric 
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service. This clear expression of the intended utility-
customer relationship fully supports the trial court's 
conclusion that no implied warranties were made or contemplated 
by the parties. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court, based upon the evidence presented, 
properly granted defendant's Motion to Dismiss. The Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law made and entered by the trial 
court were fully supported by competent and substantial 
evidence, The Judgment of Dismissal by the lower court 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully Submitted, I 
S. G. BAUCOM 
ROBERT GORDON 
Attorneys for Respondent 
P. 0. Box 899 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
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Plaintiffs-Appellants this 6th day of June, 1975, by 
mailing copies of same, postage prepaid, to their attorneys, 
David A. Robinson, 531 South State Street, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111, and Richard L. Bird, 333 East 400 South, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111. 
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